A straightforward way to prevent students from leaving education without a higher secondary diploma is increasing the compulsory education age. The idea is that, by staying longer in school, more students eventually obtain a higher secondary diploma. This paper examines the impact of a one-year increase in compulsory school-age on dropping out at secondary education by a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis. For this, we exploit a recent compulsory education policy reform in the Netherlands. After controlling for confounding factors and observable covariates, we …nd that the one year increase in compulsory school-age reduces dropout by 2.5 percentage points. The e¤ect, however, is entirely situated in the group non-liable to the policy reform. We observe that native Dutch vocational students, mostly without retention in grade, but also without a higher secondary diploma at hand, more often left school in the immediate period before the policy reform. Given the economic revival at that time, this may re ‡ect anticipation on labor market opportunities. 
Introduction
School dropout is a prominent issue in developed countries. By the year 2000, the average dropout rate in the European Union amounted to about 20%. 1 The increased attention to early school-leaving arises from growing importance to education over the last decades. Education has been considered as the ultimate solution for dealing with labor, health and social problems among other issues taking place in a knowledge-driven economy. It has been generally recognized that a higher secundary diploma is the absolute minimum requirement to, among other issues, enter succesfully the labor market, to prevent poverty or increase the awareness to health prevention (Mirowsky and Ross, 2003) . A straightforward way to prevent students from leaving education without a higher secondary diploma consists of increasing the compulsory education age. By staying longer in school, the idea is that more students eventually obtain a higher secondary diploma. Early schoolleaving would be reduced. This paper examines whether an increase of compulsary education age e¤ectively reduces school dropout.
Compulsary education: the necessity
Compulsory school-age has a relatively young history for most developed countries. For instance, most western European countries introduced compulsory education laws in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century (Murtin and Viarengo, 2007) . Thereafter, school-age has been gradually increasing in the majority of developed countries. The idea of introducing compulsory education laws arises from three angles. First, it aims at protecting youngsters from too early labor market entrance via a minimum school-age regulation. The minimum school-age is de…ned as 'the span of years during which every normal child must be receiving a formal education (OECD, 1983) .' It is country-speci…c and, depending on the type of work involved, regulates labor market en- Second, over the last decades, a high school diploma is increasingly considered as a minimum requisite for successful labor market entrance (Kaufman et al., 2004) . Whereas so- 1 In the paper at hand, we will use the terms early school leaving and dropout interchangeably.
2 cieties have developed from an industrial towards a knowledge-driven economy, educational outcomes'expectations have risen, which led to a higher demand of high-skilled workers.
Third, investment in human capital is considered as one of the main drivers of prosperity and growth (see Becker, 1975; Schultz, 1967 and many references thereto). A well educated labor force signals economic productivity (Spence, 1973) , promotes good citizenship (Milligan et al., 2004) and enhances economic development (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) . In contrast, low educated people have a higher probability to ful…ll low-skilled jobs or have a higher risk of becoming (long-term) unemployed (OECD, 2008) , among other risks (for an overview, see Psacharopoulos, 2007) . Low-skilled workers are more vulnerable to pile-up serious lifehampering problems, such as intergenerational poverty (Bowles, 1972) , poor health (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2007) and exclusion from society (Sparkes, 1999) . Once entered, it is di¢ cult to escape the downward-moving spiral -often passed on to the next generation (McLanahan, 1985) .
Compulsory education in the literature
In the paper at hand, we focus on the impact of compulsory education on school dropout. This is a rather atypical stance, as most of the literature focuses on the impact of schooling on wages or other labor market outcomes (for some examples, see Brunello and Ra¤aele, 1999 , Card, 1995 Colm and Walker, 1995, Du ‡o, 2000; Garen, 1984; Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998 ; Kane et al., 1999; Mincer, 1974) . To position the article at hand, we summarize this broad literature. Angrist and Krueger (1991) were among the …rst to use compulsory education laws to estimate the returns to schooling (and early school-leaving). Using compulsory education laws as an instrument, they …nd that about 25% of potential dropouts stay longer in school because of compulsory schooling laws. Moreover, they provide support for the bene…cial impact of longer school attendance on earnings, indicating returns of about 7.5 percent.
Oreopoulos (2003, 2006, 2007) with an increase in compulsory school-age. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, they found generally small e¤ects on wages.
The impact of compulsory education on dropout rates and, consequently, obtaining a higher secondary diploma, has not (yet) been extensively examined. Van der Steeg and Webbink (2006) stress the importance of the additional years in school because of an increase in compulsory school-age -even if the pupil still drops out of school too early. They promote the use of a sliding scale, which means that more education leads to better labor market outcomes irrespectively of actually obtaining the school-leaving certi…cate.
Identi…cation and issues
To identify the research question, we use a recent policy change in the Netherlands. 2 Before the introduction of the so-called 'Quali…cation Law'on August 1th 2007, students could leave education at their 17th birthday. 3 Since the policy change, 17 year old students should stay in school until they obtain a diploma or reach the age of 18. Every student below the age of 23, who did not obtain a higher secondary diploma before leaving school, is considered as an early school-leaver.
The identi…cation strategy, proposed in this paper, exploits the birthday-related variation in the law. In sum (an extensive discussion follows in section 2), students who were 17 years old or older on the day of the policy reform (August 1th 2007) are exempted from the policy reform. Thus, they can legally leave school at the age of 17 with or without a higher secondary diploma at hand. In contrast, students who were 16 years old or younger on the day of the policy reform, are liable to the Quali…cation Law and, hence, have to attend school until the age of 18 has been reached or a higher secondary diploma has been obtained.
The policy reform is evaluated by taking two di¤erences: (1) comparing dropout rates between liable and non-liable students of the cohort 1990 (…rst di¤ erence), and (2) comparing dropout rates of the cohort 1990 with the cohort 1989 (second di¤ erence). With respect to the …rst di¤erence, age e¤ects can bias the estimates, because older students, even in terms of months, are more likely to dropout than younger students. For this reason, we make use of a second cohort 1989 that consists out of students who are entirely exempted from the 2 Note that the Dutch Ministry of Education also enrolled alternative dropout prevention measures (such as the 2005-2006 covenant). However, given the earlier implementation and our speci…c set-up (see below), to our best knowledge, there is no signi…cant bias in the results. 3 Note that a major exception consisted of the 'partial compulsory education', which indicated that students younger than 17 could take courses for only 1 or 2 days a week. Finally, the date of birth randomly assigns individuals to control or treatment group and, as a consequence, unobserved individual heterogeneity should be on average the same in control and treatment group. In addition, we do not …nd relevant di¤erences in observed characteristics between liable an non-liable students but their liability status.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we outline the identi…cation strategy to estimate the e¤ect of an increase in compulsory school-age on dropout at secondary education. Next, section 3 brie ‡y describes the statistical information used for further analyses. Thereafter, we present the results in section 4. The …nal section deals with conclusions and discussions, respectively some advice for policymaking and caveats. 
Identi…cation strategy
The causal impact of one additional year of compulsory education (for students who did not yet obtain a higher secondary degree) on dropout is estimated on administrative data of all students going to school in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Amsterdam has among the largest dropout rates in the Netherlands (see section 4). 4 We start this section with a brief description of the Dutch education system, as the policy reform requires more insight into the organization of higher secondary education in the Netherlands. Thereafter, we set out the proposed identi…cation strategy and methodology.
The Dutch education system
The Dutch education system has three main streams: pre-university education (VWO), general upper secondary education (HAVO) and vocational secondary education (VMBO-MBO).
Students are obliged to enter one of the streams based on ability tracking. 5 We present the streams in …gure 1, where the Y-axis indicates the school-age of a regular pupil in the Dutch educational system.
We brie ‡y describe each stream (for an extensive description, see Tieben and Wolbers, 2008) . To obtain a diploma in pre-university education, a student has to succeed in six academic years. Hence, a VWO student can obtain his/her higher secondary diploma at to MBO and, thus, to obtain a higher secondary degree.
Identi…cation -The intuition
The earlier compulsary education law, dated 1969, has been changed in 2007. The law of 1969 mandated pupils to attend school until the 17th birthday. 7 After August 1th 2007, mandatory school attendance increased to the age of 18 or until a higher secondary diploma has been obtained (VWO, HAVO or MBO-level 2). In fact, the policy reform mandates students to obtain a higher secondary diploma between their 16th and 18th birthday. The goal is -as mentioned before -to obtain a minimal quali…cation for labor market entrance.
Pupils leaving school before obtaining a higher secondary diploma are considered as dropouts.
Registration of dropouts takes place up to the age of 23, which means that pupils can still ful…ll their quali…cation duty after reaching their 18th birthday.
To estimate the causal impact of compulsory education on early school-leaving, we exploit the implementation of the policy reform in the Netherlands. On the one hand, students who were born before August 1th 1990 and, hence, are 17 years old on the date of the policy reform, are exempted from the policy reform. They have to attend school until their 17th birthday has been reached. On the other hand, students born after August 1th 1990 are liable to the new Quali…cation Law. The Quali…cation Law implies mandatory school attendance until the age of 18 has been reached or until a quali…cation has been obtained. After the age of 18, parents are no longer responsible for their child to attend school. An adolescent without quali…cation has the responsibility to obtain a higher secondary diploma, but is no longer obliged to attend school. Consequently, the 2007 Quali…cation Law implies for the latter group of students a one-year increase in compulsory education age: from 17 to 18. It is clear that in this setting August 1th serves as a discontinuous date. 8 To …nd out the e¤ect of 7 The 1969 compulsory education law obliges youngsters to attend 12 full academic years in public schools (when not enrolled in private schooling). In fact, students can register for apprenticeships outside the school after their 16th birthday (i.e. partial compulsory education or dual tracks). Compulsory education starts at the student's 5th birthday. If the student reaches the age of 5 one month or more before the start of a new academic year, students are obliged to enroll for the next academic year. 8 It is important to note that thanks to this discontinuity, students in the control group and treatment group are constituting the same classes. Consequently, other policy measures to reduce dropout (such as the convenant) will have a similar e¤ect on both the treatment and the control group. In other words, without the evaluated policy change, the average observed outcomes would move parallel over time in both the treatment and the control group. The DiD model is thus not biased due to alternative policy measures.
8 a one-year increase in compulsory education age, one can easily compare the average dropout rates of the student group born before August 1th 1990 with the average dropout rates of the student group born after August 1th 1990.
However, it might be the case that both liable (to the quali…cation law) and non-liable students are sitting together in the same class, unless retention in grade(s) during the school career took place. One can argue that characteristics of students born in the …rst half of the year should not di¤er signi…cantly from students'characteristics born in the last half of the year. 9 Particularly for school dropout, however, age matters. Students of the former group are more likely to drop out as they can legally leave secondary education sooner than students from the latter group. We control for age-related aspects by taking other cohorts into account (e.g., the 1989 cohort). Doing so, time-related aspects can bias the results (Heckman et al., 1999); e.g. (1) a revival of the economy resulting in more available jobs for low-skilled people, or (2) sensitization on the relevance of a higher secondary diploma among youngsters. We shall control for age and time-e¤ects in the analysis. With this, we apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) methodology.
Before using the DiD, we …rst set out a potential outcome framework (Rubin, 1974 (Rubin, , 1987 ). This non-parametric framework has two major advantages, in particular, (1) it does not impose a priori assumptions on the functional form of the data, and (2) it allows us to visualize the e¤ect (without controlling for covariates). Secondly, we use a parametric approach to get the DiD estimator having controlled for observed heterogeneity and, as well as possible, for peer e¤ects using …xed e¤ects models.
Identi…cation -A non-parametric analysis
The conventional DiD estimator requires that, in absence of the treatment (in this case, without the policy change), the average observed outcomes for the treatment and control groups move parallel over time (Heckman, 1990; Abadie, 2005) . This assumption is the crucial identifying restriction in DiD models and is written as follows:
The individual's potential outcome at time t in absence of the treatment is denoted by Y 0 (t).
In the same way, Y 1 (t) represents the individual's potential outcome at time t when exposed to the treatment. Under the former assumption, one computes the following non-parametric (DiD) estimator as expressed by: (Heckman et al., 1997) 
where Y is the average observed outcome given the treatment status (D 2 f0; 1g) and the evaluation point in time (t 2 f0; 1g). The average observed outcomes are
We assume that the di¤erence between Y 0 and Y 1 arises only from the policy change and not from other in ‡uences.
The discontinuous date of the policy reform, that is, August 1th allows us to identify a treatment and a control group. The control group consists out of the non-liable students (born before August 1th) and the treatment group consists out of the liable pupils (born after August 1th). We denote non-liable students by (D = 0) and liable students by (D = 1).
As follows, we denote the evaluation point in time by (t = 0) for 2006 (evaluation of cohort 1989) and (t = 1) for 2007 (evaluation of cohort 1990). We summarize the composition of the control and treatment groups over time in Table 1 .
A parametric analysis
In a parametric analysis, it is easier to control for observed heterogeneity. To do so, we rewrite equation (2) to:
where 0 denotes the intercept, D i an indicator of the treatment status, T i a time indicator (before and after policy reform), X ji a vector with the individuals'observable characteristics and U i a residual. We are interested in the estimate of^ ; which is the e¤ect on dropping out given the policy reform (i.e., the student is denoted by D = 1 and T = 1). If selection into the treatment group is correlated with the error term U i , cannot be consistently estimated.
However -as argued before -we do not expect any correlation between day of birth and observed characteristics. Random assignment by date of birth to one of both groups seems a reasonable assumption. 10 11 1 0 Extensive alternative explorations on the data further strenghtens this evidence. 1 1 Unless di¤erently mentioned, in the remainder of the paper, signi…cance is measured at a 1%-level. 10 
Data
To perform the analyses, we combine registered data (so-called BRON data) of the Dutch
Ministry of Education with registered data of the municipality of Amsterdam (DMO Amsterdam). The BRON data is an unique dataset with information on all students enrolled in secondary education in the Netherlands, which is, nowadays, about 1.3 million students.
BRON data do not provide crucial information on date of birth, which is required for the identi…cation strategy. Data from DMO Amsterdam, however, do provide this necessary information. Using the personal identi…cation number, we combine the DMO Amsterdam data with the BRON data. 12 The combined dataset provides information on about 45,000 students in secondary educa- see table 2 ). Using the birthday as cut-o¤ point, we assign 6,395 pupils of the cohort 1989 to the control group or the treatment group. Of this, 3,667 and 2,728 students were born, respectively, before and after August 1th. 603 students eventually dropped out of school without a higher secondary diploma. Similarly, we assign 6,492 pupils of the cohort 1990 to either control group or treatment group, resulting in 3,629 students, respectively, 2,863 students. The total dropout number in this cohort amounts to 691 students.
Concerning the comparability between the treatment and control group, the t-statistic …nds large resemblance between control and treatment group for gender, household composition and ethnicity. Despite of this, we observe signi…cant di¤erences in school type choices.
Older pupils are more likely to enroll in higher grades, which may result in changing school type (e.g. the transition from pre-vocational education to senior secondary vocational education). With this, student composition with respect to school type choices is a confounding (age-related) factor that has to be controlled for to identify the unambiguous e¤ect of compulsary education on dropout. To cancel out the slightest e¤ect of previously mentioned covariates, we also take them into account in the parametric analyses.
Impact of compulsory education
In subsection 4.1, the results are presented of the non-parametric analysis, where observed heterogeneity is not accounted for. Subsection 4.2 deals with the results of a parametric DiD analysis, which controls for a rich set of covariates and, as well as possible, for possible peer e¤ects.
Non-parametric results
The expected values of dropout status for treatment and control group, before and after the Evaluating equation (2), we obtain a non-parametric estimate equal to -2.52 percentage points. This e¤ect is mainly driven by the students in the control group (i.e., students born before August 1). Indeed, we do not observe a signi…cant di¤erence in dropout rate between students born after August 1 (i.e., the treatment group students) in the 1989 cohort and the 1990 cohort. This suggests that treatment group students did not alter their dropout decision after the increase in compulsory education age, which is not surprising as 16 years olds under the old and new compulsory education law could not legally leave education. 
Demand for labor
To test whether the sharp increase in dropout among the non-liable students in the 1990 cohort is driven by the economy, we explore the annual change in employment among 15-25 years old people. Indeed, a revival in the economy may result in more available jobs for lowskilled youngsters, pulling them out of school. In Figure 4 , which presents the procentual annual change in employment for youngsters, we observe more job opportunities in the year Under the 1969 compulsory education law (i.e., t = 0), 17 years old students could legally leave secondary education and enter the labor market. This would change after August 1, 2007 as pupils without a higher secondary degree had to stay in school (i.e., t = 1). The latest cohort of students who could legally leave education at their 17th birthday are students from the 1990 cohort born before August 1 (i.e., t = 1; d = 0). Given the economic upturn and the resulting increase in vacancies, an arguable explanation of the increase in dropout among non-liable students might come from full…lling of job market opportunities by control group students (as treatment group students were not allowed). In other words, it seems that employers grasped the last opportunity to employ lowly educated youngsters (a next cohort entering the labor market would take two years). 14 If that is the case, the parallel time trend assumption could be violated and the estimate of^ may be inconsistent. We consider next subsection.
Parallel Time Trend Assumption
At this point, it is important to take the crucial assumption underlying the di¤erence-indi¤erences analysis into consideration: the parallel time trend assumption (see eq. 1). This assumption implies that, in absence of the treatment, control and treatment group would have been moved parallel over time. A critical assessment of this assumption is necessary as Figure 3 may indicate that the assumption is violated, because the increase in dropout among control group students can be attributed to an economic revival at the given point in time
and not to the policy reform. If the economic revival is the main driver of the estimate of^ and not the policy reform, than^ would also have been estimated in absence of the treatment.
As a result, the estimate of^ is not the e¤ect of an increase in compulsory school-age.
A careful evaluation points out that the parallel time trend assumption is not violated.
We discuss three reasons.
First, we observe students from the cohorts 1988 to 1991 in the sample. We plot normalized dropout rates ( To do so, we compare by a t-statistic students born in January (control group) with students born in August (treatment group). The estimate of^ is equal to -5.23
and signi…cant at a 10%-level.
Second, we apply a more detailed de…nition of school dropout. Thanks to detailed data for Amsterdam students, we observe students who left school for longer than 2 weeks (but who may come back after that period). We denote this period as 'truancy'although it is similar to school dropout for a particular period. In 2007, relatively high truancy rates were observed in the months June (10.81%), July (8.18%) and August (54.79%). It seems that 17 years old nonliable students attended school until the end of the academic year 2006-07. Thereafter, they dropped out of school (by not enrolling into the new academic year 2007-08) without a higher secondary diploma at hand. At this given point in time, total number of vacancies soared to a record hight (cf. subsection 4.1). Having in mind that date of birth randomly assigns individuals to control or treatment group and, as a consequence, (un)observed individual heterogeneity should be on average the same in control and treatment group, we do not …nd relevant di¤erences between liable an non-liable students but their liability status. 16 An exogenous labor demand shock should have a¤ected liable students in the same way as 4   1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1989  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1990  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 In sum, we argue the parallel time trend assumption to hold.
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation
To allow for heterogeneity in the control and treatment group, we estimate the DiD model as (1) t-values between brackets.
(2) We use robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. Chi-squared(1) = 81.93; Prob > chi 2 = 0.0000. (3) Gender and ethnicity are the individual characteristics. As family characteristics we include household composition. School type characteristics refer to pre-vocational and vocational education, general secondary education and pre-university education. Postcode information captures neighborhood characteristics. We include …xed e¤ects for students and neighborhoods to cluster information and, with this, to control for peer e¤ects at student level (model 3) and neighborhood level (model 4). (4) Model 3 has also been estimated by means of pooled OLS using clustered standard errors at the student level. Similar results have been found.
results support con…dence to the non-parametric estimations where we obtained a similar outcome.
A second model includes covariates, such as individual (gender, ethnicity), family (household composition) and school type characteristics. The interaction e¤ect is slightly lower, whereas the estimate of^ is equal to -2.45 percentage points at a 5% signi…cance level.
In ‡uence of peer e¤ects
Peer e¤ects are likely to occur among students sitting in the same class as some students are liable to the policy change while others do not. This violates the Stable Unit Value Assumption (SUTVA), i.e. we assume that the potential outcomes are independent of actual treatment assignment (Rubin, 1978) . The accouncement of a possible policy reform with respect to the compulsory education age took place on the thrid tuesday of September 2006 (i.e., Prinsjesdag). 18 The Quali…cation Law and its implications were under discussion in the …rst half of the year 2007, when 'compulsory education days' were organized to inform parents and students about the policy reform and its implications. In 2007, the lower Chamber agreed 1 8 On "Prinsjesdag", the Dutch government opens a new year for the lower and upper Chamber. To approximate peer e¤ects, we estimate equation (3) 
Robustness analysis
This subsection estimates various robustness analyses to check the results. First, we perform the analysis taking a di¤erent cohort (1988) to control for age and time-e¤ects. Next, we narrow down the window around the cut-o¤ point August 1th, taking into account only students born during July and August. Third, we test the impact of compulsory education on early school-leaving among di¤erent school type choices and ethnicities. To conclude, we focus on students with retention in grade.
Cohort 1988
A …rst robustness test compares the 1990 cohort (i.e., the cohort liable to the increase in (2) of Table 3 .
to the cohort 1989. This further strengthens our previous argument that the increase in dropout among non-liable 17 years olds in the year 2007 was rather exceptional.
Smaller window
Up to now, the control group has been de…ned as students born from January 1 to July 31 and the treatment group as students born from August 1 to December 31. We narrow down the window to a smaller group of students. In particular, we include only students in the analysis who were born one month before and one month after the cut-o¤ point of August 1. This means that we only take students born during the summer break months July and August into account. The July students are exempted from the policy reform's implication, whereas the August students are not. As evaluation of dropout rates between
July and August students takes place on October 1, they both have the age of 17 in the sample. The former group is merely less than one month older than the latter, however, di¤ers by liability status. The estimate of^ without controlling for covariates is equal to -2.52 percentage points and, hence, is similar to previous results of model (1) . The t-statistic on the interaction e¤ect drops as a result of the smaller group in analysis (which is intuitive as fewer students are included in the sample).
Heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect among student groups
The sample in model 1 to 4 includes all students of the cohorts 1989 and 1990 attending secondary school in the city of Amsterdam. Because of individual heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect, it can be expected that the impact of an increase in compulsory education is for some groups of students higher than for other groups. This third robustness analysis narrows down the sample to particular groups of students.
First, consider the estimate of^ for di¤erent school type choices. As referred to in subsection 2, vocational students (MBO) are more vulnerable to dropping out at secondary education. We observe that the interaction e¤ect for vocational students is largest, equal to -3.32 percentage points, and signi…cant at a 10%-level. After controlling for some covariates (see model (2)), the interaction e¤ect increases in value to -3.40 percentage points (P>0.05).
Taking only pre-university education (VWO) and senior general secondary education (HAVO) into account, we observe that the estimates of^ are no longer signi…cant. After controlling for covariates, the insigni…cant interaction e¤ects of VWO and HAVO are equal to 0.56 percentage points respectively 0.24 percentage points.
Second, we present the results of an DiD analysis applied on di¤erent ethnic groups. As a …rst ethnic group, we focus on native Dutch students. Performing the analysis without controlling for covariates, the estimate of^ is signi…cant (at 1%-level) and equal to -6.12
percentage points. The interaction e¤ect declines to -4.94 percentage points after controlling for covariates (but still signi…cant). In contrast, as a second ethnic group, we do not observe signi…cant results for non-native students. The DiD-estimates before and after controlling for covariates are, respectively, -0.060 and -0.100 percentage points. The results indicate that Dutch natives were in ‡uenced the most by the 2007 compulsory education age reform.
Retention in grade
Retention in grade is often referred to as a strong predictor of dropout (e.g., Goldsmith and Wang, 1999; Roderick et al., 2000) . The 2007 compulsory education law may have lead to lower school dropout among students with one year of retention, because these control students could have been in ‡uenced to stay in school by their liable peers. Given the above analysis on peer e¤ects, however, we do not expect much e¤ect.
We create a dummy variable indicating retention in grade. 19 In the sample, we count 799 students (10.95%) and 525 students (9.39%) with retention in grade in the control group respectively the treatment group. 20 Restricting the sample to retention students and estimating the DiD model in equation (3), delivers insigni…cant results. The estimate of^ ; without controlling for covariates, is insigni…cant (at 10%-level) and equal to -1.59 percentage points.
We note, however, the smaller group in the analysis. The t-statistic on the interaction e¤ect drops. Next, we perform the same analysis keeping only students without retention in grade in the sample. The interaction e¤ect is equal to -2.67 percentage points and signi…cant at a 5%-level. The results suggest that retention in grade partially wipes out the increase in dropout (as visualized on Figure 4 ) among non-liable 17 years olds in the year 2007.
Discussion and Conclusion
The impact of compulsary education age on dropout at secondary education has received little attention in the evidence-based literature. This paper dealt with the e¤ect of a oneyear increase in compulsory education age on school dropout. The in ‡uence of increased compulsary education is examined by exploiting a policy change in the Netherlands.
First, in a non-parametric analysis, we observe a direct impact of 2.52 percentage points fewer dropouts thanks to the increase in compulsary education. A closer inspection of the results, however, reveals that the latter observation is mainly driven by an increase in dropout among 17 years old students exempted from the policy's implications. Various robustness analysis were performed. As such, we used another cohort (i.e., cohort 1988) to track in ‡uences over time. This indicates that the increase in dropout among 17 years old students after the policy reform was rather exceptional. We argued that the economic upturn resulted in a large number of vacancies for semi-and unskilled workers. Employers might aim to attract the non-liable (to the policy change) students. Next, to control more for unobserved heterogeneity, we have narrowed down the sample size to students born one month before and one month after August 1th. These students celebrate their birthday during summer holidays. The t-statistic declines but the DiD estimate without controlling for covariates is equal to -2.52 percentage points, that is, similar to previous results. Moreover, we have controlled for observable heterogeneity among di¤erent student groups with respect to school type choices, ethnicity and retention in grade. We observe the largest impact among vocational students (-3.32 percentage points) and Dutch natives (-6.12 percentage points).
Last, we have estimated the impact of the one-year increase in compulsory education age on students with retention in grade. Keeping only students with retention in analysis, the e¤ect drops to insigni…cant results of -1.59 percentage points.
Although the results reveal a signi…cant decrease in dropout thanks to the compulsory education law, some caution is in place. The observed e¤ect arises almost completely from the fact that more students, exempted from the policy implications, mostly without retention in grade, but also without a higher secondary degree at hand, left school at the legally schoolleaving age after the policy reform. Given the economic revival at the time of the policy reform, this may suggest an anticipation on job market opportunities. On the contrary, students liable to the policy reform did not signi…cantly alter their dropout decision.
As a major issue for discussion, the results of this paper point to the unintended consequences of straightforward policymaking. Even though the new Quali…cation Law did not intentionally in ‡uence control group students, the results may indicate that other heavyweight principals in the market economy were a¤ected by the policy reform causing a labor demand shock for semi-and unskilled youngsters. The e¤ect is local in nature as it only a¤ected a small group of students.
Finally, some caveats are in place. We have no insights in the life-time gains of education for the a¤ected youngsters, leaving a lot of open questions with respect to their perspectives.
In the literature, the importance of a higher secondary diploma is stressed to enter successfully the labor market and to avoid life-time disadvantages. Further research should bring more unambiguous insights in the role of labor market incentives and the return to education within the scope of school dropout determinants. 
